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Abstract: 
The chimerical state is not only a hybrid state. It is also a state of obscure powers. As the classical 
chimera, much of its strength comes precisely from the fact that it hard to see and hence to 
investigate and critique.  The paper traces the origins of this difficulty to the role the public-private 
divide plays in hiding chimerical power. It does so with reference specifically to the security area. 
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Introduction: Chimeras of Obscure Powers 
Hurt and Lipschutz picture the 21st state as a powerful chimera. They point to the strength and continued 
centrality of a state that seems far from retreating, declining or disappearing. The state they describe has the 
power to form structures that shape practices. In their thinking, the possibility of this chimerical state to 
(re)define the property rights underpinning economic and social organization is of particular significance.1
A chimera is a hybrid and monstrous creature. But a chimera is also the classical example of a “non-
being”; something that does not exist and therefore can neither be investigated nor understood.
 
Moreover, Hurt and Lipschutz argue that important changes in how the state works, how government 
functions and is understood are key to the 21st Century state. They insist on the hybrid nature of a state that 
has become integral to market practices and which has made space for markets within itself. This hybridity is 
what leads them to call this state a chimera. This picture of the state as a chimera useful captures key aspects 
of unfolding developments of the state and therefore promises to move the ongoing discussion forward. This 
“think piece” will therefore focus on the notion of a chimerical state as formulated by Hurt and Lipschutz, 
but insist on a second connotation of chimera that is not central to their account but that is central to the 
chimerical 21st Century state. 
2 Although 
Hurt and Lipschutz do not emphasize this obscure and invisible side of the chimera in their discussion of the 
21st Century state, it is highly relevant. This paper suggests that it is essential for understanding/explaining its 
power. The effectiveness of Hurt and Lipschutz’s chimerical state—its capacity to branch out and be 
intrusive—rests on the obscure nature of its power; the difficulty of grasping and seeing it. Specifically the 
argument in this paper is that the public-private divide plays a key role in producing the chimerical (obscure) 
state.3
1. The Power to Obscure Responsibility 
 The paper points to the mechanisms by which it does so. It discusses three mechanisms in particular: 
the way the public-private distinction obscures 1) responsibility, 2) orderings and 3) the related regulatory 
requirements. These arguments are made with reference to security governance; not because they are unique 
to security, but because it is important to anchor the argument. 
Although the degree of “hybridization” is—as underlined by Hurt and Lipschutz—well noted and amply 
observed, it is rarely followed by an acknowledgement of the need to analyze the resulting hybrid as a hybrid 
rather than as a sum of its public and private parts. Instead, thinking, talking, acting and observing in terms 
                                                     
1 One could broaden that view and emphasize the continued “state monopoly on symbolic violence” (central also to its 
influence on property rights). This expression is taken from Bourdieu (, 1991 #304 or 2000), but analogous forms of 
though can be found in a number of thinkers some of which will be discussed below. 
2 Consider e.g. Ashworth (1977). 
3 This argument is not new. It echoes feminist thinkers, but also classical political economy. More than this one might 
say that it is analogous to thinking about the fundamental importance of the inside/outside distinction in international 
politics. But this is no place to develop these links or to expand why I focus on the private public rather than the 
inside/outside. 
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of a public-private divide continues to be not only common but dominant. The implications of falling back 
on the public-private divide—of chopping the chimera to pieces— is that it appears far weaker than it is. 
This paper traces the mechanisms by which power eludes the observers. The first mechanism it discusses 
works through the obscuring of responsibility. At least in security, the acknowledgement of hybridization is 
not matched by the recognition of hybrid responsibilities. Rather, prevailing accountability systems (legal, 
political and social) separate public and private responsibility strictly. This paves the way for a constant 
category shifting by hybrid actors seeking to avoid responsibility. The overarching consequence is that 
responsibility remains obscure and intangible. As the hybrid is fractured through the public-private lens, its 
power becomes invisible and hard to pin down; it becomes chimerical in the sense of obscure. 
Hybridization of the Public-Private Roles in Security Government 
In debates about the current market for private military and security services, one of the (few) widely agreed 
upon and established truths is that the public and private are very closely intertwined. Everyone working in 
the market is an-ex something. Inversely private actors are part of the public armed forces providing training, 
intelligence, logistics or guarding services for most armed forces.4
 The expression SOBEL—merging Soldier and Rebel—captures hybridity as enmeshment in 
language. However, the phenomenon is by no means restricted to the context of weak states in the 
developing world. A soldier on leave from the South African Defense Forces working as a contractor is both 
a South African Soldier and a contractor at the same time. Civilian technicians assisting in the collection of 
surveillance data during operations missions, civilian maintainers providing battlefield maintenance of a 
TOW missile, the M1A1, the Bradley, or the Patriot missile and contractors supporting the gathering and 
interpreting of data from the Joint Air Forces Control Centre and feeding intelligence and targeting 
information to operators are not simply “private” actors but contractors on the battle field assisting US armed 
forces. 
 The way that this is often captured is 
through images of “revolving doors” between the public and the private spheres. However, perhaps a better 
description of the situation is one of (partially) enmeshed spheres (Leander, 2009). In truly hybrid fashion, 
individuals are frequently both private and public at the same time.  
 Hybridity has become integral to security practices, observers but also those active in security 
governance have integrated it into their own world. Security professionals see the worlds as largely 
integrated. “The circuit” is the telling title of a book where a security professional (former SAS) reflects on 
how the creation of a market has altered his career—and more generally the fate of security professionals—
who move in and out of public service. Instead of retiring as a body guard, the author has travelled across the 
world including to Afghanistan, Iraq, the West Bank and Gaza in the service of companies. However, from 
                                                     
4 Even the People’s Republic of China has allowed and encouraged a private market for military and security services. 
In fact, with very few exceptions such as North Korea and Cuba, hybridization seems to have developed in most places. 
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his perspective he has remained inside “the circuit”—in singular—of security professionals of his own 
category (Shepherd, 2008). But also in politics and public opinion is hybridity acknowledged. The Pentagon 
integrates contractors working directly for the US armed forces in their casualty counts. A study of US 
public opinion shows that reactions to the fate of public contractors differ only marginally from reactions to 
the fate of soldiers (Avant??). Finally, lawyers, whether working to defend human rights, with the armed 
forces or dealing with contractual issues are acutely aware of hybridity. They have an intense discussion—
Kierpaul (2008) terms it a mad scramble—to sort out how to make legal categories more applicable and 
useful for the category of activities created by actors spanning the public private divide (e.g. Zamparelli, 
1999, Heaton, 2005, ICRC, 2008).  
 Paradoxically the widespread consensus that the market is a hybrid, that roles are often hybrid and 
that the lines between public and private are frequently entirely “blurred”, has not triggered discussions 
about hybrid forms of responsibility and responsibilization. Instead as soon as attention is switched from 
issues of roles to issues of responsibility the framing changes. Conventional legal and political terminologies 
structured by the public-private divide take the overhand. The hybridity of roles is left behind and the 
questions are reframed as if we were dealing with distinct and separable public and private actors. The issue 
civilians remain civilians and the military military; the market is the market and the state, the state. This is a 
formalistic definitional trick that makes it possible to frame hybridity in the well known terms and categories 
of conventional Western political thought (Cutler, 1999). However, it is a trick that comes at a price. It 
obscures the power of Chimera and makes it difficult to attribute responsibility. 
 
Category Shift /Blame Avoidance and Creating Invisibility 
The power of the classical chimera was located in its combination of features. If it had been approached only 
through its parts, it would just have been a normal lion head and a normal snake. The monstrous dimension 
would have been lost. But more than this, if the chimera’s head had been asked about its power and 
responsibility in a given situation, it could have argued that not only was it not responsible; its tail was. More 
than this is could have tried to show that not only was it not responsible it was actually hampered and 
weakened by the snake tail and in no way to be held responsible. This captures the logic by which the public-
private divide makes the power of the chimerical (hybrid) state a chimera (obscure) to which responsibility 
can hardly be attributed. 
By not looking for hybrid responsibilities, the public-private framing of accountability claims simply 
makes part of the power and part of the acts of the chimera disappear entirely. This is notably the case of the 
kinds of action that cannot be fitted into the established categories for dealing with military/security 
operations. Legal language and thought makes it difficult to raise them at all. This is the case of private 
security companies doing classical policing or military work in the service of hybrid or private institutions in 
conflict areas. Examples could be Triple Canopy employees working for private companies on public 
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contracts or semi-governmental institutions of development in Iraq, Gray security guarding installations (in 
partial collaboration with the police) for oil companies (on partially) in the Niger Delta, Armor group 
working for an NGO in Afghanistan. These companies are regulated as private actors working for clearly 
clients, although if one took hybridity seriously the issue is more complex. In practice the hybridity of roles 
is acknowledge as visible in the assimilation of the companies with the public armed forces  by those 
opposing both, in the resentment of the civilians, and in the concern of those who wish to remain a terrain of 
neutrality sapped by hybridity (Spearin, 2008). Legally the consequence is that responsibility in these 
situations tends to disappear behind the veil of the public-private distinction.  
The failure to link roles and responsibilities lays the foundation for a constant category and blame 
shifting game, where the private-public divide sets the basic rules. The stake in the game is circumventing 
justice and accountability systems. Hence governments are prone to distance themselves from the doings of 
market actors to avoid blame. The US government distanced itself in relation to Nisour Square and the UK 
government from to the Sandline affair.5
This category shifting is plausible. This is so partly due to the frequent references to the contradictions 
and tensions between the public and private. Public officials (security professionals and members of the 
armed forces) both in the West and in the developing world are increasingly prone to make the argument 
summed up by the title of a recent Brookings report: “Can't Win with 'Em, Can't Go to War without 'Em” 
(Singer, 2007). Perhaps more surprisingly, also companies make similar claims. For example, SITE 
Intelligence (a small company surveilling Islamic internet sites for the Pentagon) recently complained that 
the public mishandling of their information ruined their spying efforts (Warrick, 2007).  
 Inversely companies are quick to point their link to states and to 
seek protection because of this link. Eric Prince (CEO of Blackwater) repeatedly underlined his (and his 
company’s) compliance with the contract they had with the state department in the hearings surrounding the 
Nisour Square incident (Tyrell, 2007). Similarly, in his defense of CACI’s reputation in the wake of 
company’s role in Abu Ghraib Jack London insists that the employees followed instructions (London, 2008). 
More than this it is plausible because as long as we see hybrid actors as divisible into the public and 
the private there clearly is no reason why one should accept responsibility for the other. Why should the state 
take responsibility for the acts of employees of a private company? And why, inversely, should companies 
working for the state take responsibility for doing what was asked of them? But plausibility just makes blame 
avoidance more effective and the awards for winning the category shifting blame avoidance game 
correspondingly more attractive. It was so extensively used in the 19th Century that Thomson sees the 
difficulties and conflicts triggered by “plausible deniability” as the main reason for outlawing of private uses 
of force internationally (Thomson, 1994). At present, the trend to hybridity makes such outlawing highly 
                                                     
5 Of course these incidences illustrate the complexities involved. The US was in fact profoundly divided as the state 
department was prone to back up Blackwater against overall outrage and similarly for the foreign office in the Sandline 
affair. 
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improbably. Instead, the main effect is to exacerbate the difficulty of attributing legal and political 
responsibility and hence of obfuscating power relations in the area. The consequence is that demands for 
accountability have been marred by difficulties. Critics used to argue that no company has ever been held 
responsible for anything. There are exceptions to this truth. However, the overall picture is that hybridity has 
engendered a “culture of impunity” (Leander, 2007a, Human Rights First, 2008) where the companies and 
market actors themselves invent the rules they follow.  
The obscuring of responsibility may be more central to hybrid power in security governance than to 
other fields because concerns with responsibility are unusually significant there. The attention to 
hybridization in security has been driven by a desire to improve accountability.6
2. The Power to Obscure Change in Order 
 Whether exceptional or not, 
it has made the public-private framing of the discussion key to obscuring hybrid power in security 
governance there. The lack of effective accountability is integral to the power of the chimera. But it also part 
of what makes the chimera illusive, hard to pin down, and to describe. The practical difficulty of holding 
responsible is paired with a difficulty of identifying power; the quest for accountability structured by the 
public-private divide confirms and consolidates the chimera as a non-being that cannot be investigated or 
seen. 
A second mechanism by which the public-private divide makes hybrid power invisible and inscrutable is by 
obfuscating its implications for order, for how security governance functions beyond formal institutional 
changes. Formal institutional orders are important. As shown by many scholars, and confirmed by Hurt and 
Lipschutz in their contribution to this discussion, state sanctioning and approval is of essence for many 
activities. This is true of economic activities structured by property rights. It also true of security related 
activities structured by state sanctions, approval and by its intrusive and surveilling gaze. This said 
substantive order cannot be reduced to formal institutional settings and arrangements. “Order is at once and 
the same time, that which is given in things as their inner law, the hidden network that determines the way 
the confront one another, and also that which has no existence except in the grid created by a glance, an 
examination, a language; and it is only in the blank spaces of this grid that order manifests itself in depth as 
though already there, waiting in silence for the moment of its expression” (Foucault, 1965: xix). The public-
private divide turns changes in order in this sense into a chimera. 
 
                                                     
6 Concerns with the accountability of contractors on behalf of the armed forces depending on them, the lawyers and 
advocates of the civilians whose rights they (sometimes) violate, the state that pays them and their own employees that 
demand accountability on work related issues have played a key role in triggering discussion about the market. But the 
other side of the coin—the accountability of states and their armed forces towards contractors, for the acts contractors 
commit working for them or for private entities (NGOs, companies, or individuals)—should not be underestimated. 
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The Critique of Institutional Form 
The public-private divide has shaped the way that the discussion about the implications of hybridity for 
governance is unfolding. It has focused it on the changes that are occurring in formal arrangements. It has 
produced a much warranted and significant critique of the evolution of institutional arrangements and 
procedures. It would hence be misguided to purport that there is no interest in governance. However, it is 
important to realize the extent to which the discussion remains confined to institutional forms of order. Two 
recurring issues that have occupied a central place in the debate will be used to illustrate this point: the 
implications of privatization for state-building and for democracy. 
A dominant locus of debate and critique with regard to hybridity in the security realm has been the 
question of whether it fosters or undermines (the development of) stable state institutions in the developing 
world. This is a reflection of the early awareness of the significance of hybrid forms of security governance 
in the third world as well as of the steadily growing concern with “state-building”. More substantively the 
discussion has opposed, on the one hand, those assuming/arguing that hybridity undermines the construction 
of stable institutional arrangements. The reasoning has been that a stringent state monopoly on the legitimate 
use of force is of essence and that hybridity undermines it. Markets and privatization threaten stability and 
state building by creating rival authorities in the form of neo-imperial companies (Francis, 1999) or non-state 
groups that can contest central authority (Ayoob, 1992, Musah and Fayemi, 2000). On the other side of the 
discussion, are those who underline that hybridity is in reality an efficient  “state survival” strategy (Reno, 
2004). This strategy, it is suggested, may be crucial to strengthening states in the long run as it allows them 
to bolster the capacity of their armed forces (Howe, 2001). As persuasively shown by Avant’s work, 
although the debate is still open, there are few empirical cases that support the argument that institutions are 
consolidated by hybridity. The only case she finds going in this direction is the case of Croatia, where MPRI 
played an essential part, training the armed forces and in enabling them to undertake the Kraijna offensive 
which allowed the Croats to push out the Serbs and establish their own state (Avant, 2005).  
Second, the extensive and much publicized contractor involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq has 
raised awareness that hybridity may influences also the institutions and formal arrangements of strong and 
democratic states. Echoing Hannah Arendt’s worry during the Vietnam war (1958) that practices breaking 
norms abroad would inevitably reshape the state also at home has been given a twist by those concerned with 
the institutional impact of contractors. Explicitly framing their arguments against those who suggest that 
outsourcing and privatization—and the related creation of “hybrid” institutions—are just new means for the 
state to pursue its policies (e.g. Shearer, 1998), they are concerned that hybridity transforms the workings of 
democracy (Avant and Sigelman, 2008). They have also focused on the degree to which it alters the potential 
for controlling the use of force at home: the deployment of contractors is not subject to the kind of control 
and monitoring that exists for public forces correspondingly weakening the parliamentary and expert 
oversight (Singer, 2003).  
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As interest in regulation has grown, so has the intensity of the focus on the impact of hybridity on 
transformation of formal institutional arrangements and on the kinds of reforms required necessary to take 
these transformations into consideration when developing regulation for the private security market. There 
can be no doubt that this discussion is important. For those concerned with the implications of hybridity it is 
of essence to understand formal institutional transformations and the means to respond to them. Similarly, it 
is far from surprising that for political and legal theorists the issue of procedure, rather that of substance, 
stands is the main concern (Flathman, 1980). However, it is equally essential to acknowledge the limits of 
this kind of framing; of directing attention and critique primarily at the institutional arrangements and at the 
formal changes in the private public divide and neglecting changes in substance and in order in a broader 
sense. 
The Invisibility of Order 
For all its utility the focus on how hybridity alters formal institutional arrangements and what the 
implications are, it is also a focus that distracts attention from how hybridity alters order in a broader sense. 
Arguably some of the most powerful effects of hybridity are to change institutions from within, to change the 
way that (formally public and private) institutions and individuals govern themselves: that is the way they 
understand the world, their own interests and motivations and hence their behavior. It in other words 
contributes to turn a central aspect of hybrid power into a chimera, a non-being not to be studied.  
This point is perhaps most readily made by pointing to the extent to which hybridity is provoking 
profound changes in the ordering of things. Returning again to the security area, it does so firstly by altering 
what counts as a resource inside (public and private institutions) and how these resources are distributed 
among people. The hybrid market has created great opportunities for security professionals. The salaries are 
usually well above the salaries in the public institutions (police or armed forces) in which they have their 
base. This potential for earning substantially more in the market has increased the attention paid to earnings 
in the armed forces and also the differentiation among those who can and do have access to the high market 
salaries and those who do not. Money has become a more important source of differentiating among security 
professionals than in the past. As this is the case, the kind of qualifications and professional traits that are 
valued in the market are also increasingly valued within public security institutions. Security professionals 
with elite skills and past experience with elite troops have been in particular demand as illustrated by the 
15.000 or so false Navy Seals (Lee Lanning, 2002: 176). The effect of the market has been to heighten the 
status of these (conventional) elite troops even further. Moreover, the companies hiring contractors as well as 
the firms and states they work for attach considerable importance to the nationality of the contractors. Hence 
contractors from the US, the UK and the West more broadly have been considerably advantaged by the 
market. The effect has been to reinforce and consolidate classical military values and the importance of 
national belonging precisely at a time when the many armed forces have strived to develop the “softer” skills 
considered important in peace keeping. The de-facto redefinition and redistribution of resources through 
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hybridity is in other words working against much of the declared reform ambitions and altering security 
institutions from within.  
The redefinition and reshuffling of resources goes in pair with—reinforces and is reinforced by—
transformations also in dominant forms of security thinking. The increased status of classical military skills 
and of people mastering these goes in pair with a valuation of an equally classical view on the profession of 
security provision (privately or publicly exercised). There is a crying need for serious studies of how 
hybridity is reshaping the identity and ethics of security professionals.7
The impact of hybridity is likely to leave its traces beyond the strict sphere of security professionals. 
Policy-making and regulatory institutions in security are also likely to be reshaped by the hybridity from 
within. Also there, both resources and understanding are likely to be reshuffled by hybridity (Leander, 
2005b, , 2005a). This is all the more the case because hybridity in security is located in a more general 
context of new public management expressing liberal thinking about how to govern (e.g. Salskov-Iversen et 
al., 2000). Links to the market through e.g. public-private-partnerships and various kinds of informal 
platforms have acquired a value in and of themselves. They confer and legitimacy and authority to people 
who engage in them inside public administrations (Sending and Neumann, 2006). This is also true in the 
security field. It is revealing that when the EU tried to promote PPPs in that area, the public side was far 
more eager than the private and on both sides the terminology of public-private-partnerships was often 
reversed and termed private-public-partnerships (Dorn and Levi, 2007 ). 
 However, what transpires through the 
many documentaries, interviews, journalistic accounts, blogs and mailing lists indicates that the market is (as 
one would expect) mirroring the ethics and culture in the elite troops that rank high in the demand. The 
Blackwater employees in Baghdad refer to their own style as “CDI–Chicks Dig It” (Young Pelton, 2006: 9). 
The Triple Canopy employees in Iraq talk about the norms that regulate their behaviour as “Big Boys Rules” 
(Fainaru, 2008). Rape charges have been recurring against contractors (Isenberg, 2008, Houppert, 2008). The 
image that transpire places the successful contractor closer to the conventional soldier with all this implies in 
terms of a gendered, “hard” skilled oriented professional culture, than to the soft skilled peacekeeper. The 
imprint of this professional culture is driven to its extreme and perverted in incidences such as that in Nisour 
Square (where Blackwater employees killed 17 Iraqi civilians September 2008 for no good reason) or those 
related in the Aegis “Trophy video” where contractors filmed themselves while shooting randomly at 
civilians while driving in Iraq. Without implying that these kinds of incidences are an inevitable consequence 
of hybridity, there is a need for considering transformations in professional ethics and attitudes and the ways 
in which these transformations span across the public-private parts of the security profession. 
                                                     
7 An industry association sponsored study [Schultz is employed by the British Association of Private Security 
Companies] of the role of gender is hardly a good guide (Schultz and Yeung, 2008). So this is an area where more 
research is really needed!! 
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The trouble with an analysis focusing on institutional changes—on formally enshrined transformations 
of procedure—is that it misses these developments; they blind themselves to changes within institutions that 
involve neither changes in procedures nor a redistribution of competencies and authorities. Hybridity alters 
“positions” and “dispositions” in a Bourdieu sense.8
 
 Realizing that these changes have profound political 
implications is important. They work against the professed intention of most policy-makers and security 
professionals to encourage a more “cosmopolitan” and “post-modern” form of security practice (Moskos et 
al., 2000, Elliot and Cheesman, 2004). Allowing the public-private divide to guide assessment of current 
security governance makes the power reinstating conventional military values difficult to understand and 
largely invisible. It becomes a chimera (non-being) strengthening the chimerical state. 
3. The Power to Obscure Regulatory Requirements 
Finally, perhaps the most effective way the private-private divide obscures the power of the chimerical states 
is by obscuring the need for critique, of working against critical assessment of the power of chimerical states 
and the way it is practiced. The inside/outside divide obscures politics by focusing attention on the polis and 
the cosmopolis —both presuming the state and hence making it impossible to critique the power produced by 
that assumption (Walker, 2003). Similarly, the public-private divide obscures the power produced by taking 
that divide as a point of departure. This is visible in the bootstrapping logic guiding in the debates current 
and very lively discussions about how to deal with the “privatization” of the governance over the use of the 
force. But most strongly it is visible in the limited scope of critical thinking about the public-private chimera 
as a whole and the even more limited space this thinking occupies in the debate about reforms of security 
governance.  
The “Bootstrapping” Logic of Reforms 
Suggestions for how to improve security governance abound. The urge to improve accountability in security 
sector governance is paramount in quite literally all contexts ranging from security sector reform in Liberia 
or Sierra Leone to contractor regulation in the European Union. It would hence be misleading to suggest that 
critique of “hybridity” was lacking or that reform suggestions were scarce. Quite the opposite is true. 
However, most of this discussion and the ensuing suggestions take their departure in the public-private 
divide with the consequence that the processes genuinely anchored in hybridity become distant and moot. 
Hybridity becomes chimerical. 
The focus on the public-private divide gives both the critique and the proposed changes a 
bootstrapping logic; a logic whereby one pulls oneself up by ones boot straps, that is by the own capacities. 
                                                     
8 For a discussion of the utility of this approach see (Leander, 2008). Obviously (?) the best source for anyone wishing 
to think in terms of Bourdieu inspired fields and practices, is Bourdieu’s own work (e.g. Bourdieu, 2004, , 2005). 
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In the security area there is hence extensive focus on improving and using the kinds of regulatory logics that 
already exist. Introducing and improving administrative procedures, training staff combined with hiring more 
qualified staff, improving the supervision/control over contractors and introducing better auditing/ 
transparency and political control at all levels of activity are without any doubt the kinds of measures that are 
most often discussed as ways of improving the governance of the increasingly hybrid security area (from the 
European context see e.g. Assemblée Nationale, 2003, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2002, Wodarg, 
2008). These measures—and there is no intention here to deny that many of these could be “useful” and 
“important”—share the presupposition that if the markets were only institutionalized and regulated in a more 
effective fashion hybridity per se would not be an issue of concern. In fact, hybridity is not really there at all 
in the discussion. It is assumed that there are public and private actors that may work together in public-
private partnerships but that are essentially governed by different purposes and rationalities. The task of 
reformers and regulators is to ensure that these logics work well together.  
In this discussion there is also (at times) acknowledgement that the privatization may have gone “too 
far”; that “bootstrapping” within the logic of existing spheres may not be sufficient. However, the response 
to that kind of situation is also to “bootstrapping” in the sense of falling back on the own logic. The debate 
over “inherently governmental functions” in security expresses the concern with the way the boundaries 
between the public and private spheres have evolved. It is a very explicit attempt to reestablish a stricter and 
tighter boundary between the two spheres. The rationale of focusing on the establishment of “inherently 
governmental functions” is to reassert and secure the public-private division and thereby to make sure that 
the entire institutional and discursive resources that hinge on that division can be brought in to play in the 
governance of hybrid security. It is a conservative bootstrapping logic that is put at work. A logic of 
analyzing and reforming according to the categories that we have. The arguments in this paper so far have 
underlined the extent to which this is likely to be ineffective and to obscure the power of the hybrid 
chimerical state. The point here is that it also confines and restricts the scope and capacity of critical thinking 
about it to that which can be framed within the public-private logic; critical debates about reform and 
regulation are caught in a logic of bootstrapping reform. 
The bootstrapping reform logic is not limited to security governance. The term has been borrowed 
from the discussion about evolving governance forms more generally where reflexivity has become a 
guiding principle (Sabel, 1995, and 2007). However, in the realm of security governance reflexive 
bootstrapping logics have uncommonly conservative implications. The centrality of the state monopoly on 
legitimate violence, of a strict division between public and private, makes it more difficult to integrate 
thinking in hybrid forms of governance in the bootstrapping logic than might be the case in areas where 
hybridity has a long history and is less contentious such as for example in health care in the US, education in 
Denmark or in the regulation of the internet.  
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The Blind Spot 
The most consequential implication of the bootstrapping reform logic, shaped by the public-private divide, is 
not what it does but what it fails to do. It fails to focus critical attention on hybridity as such, where hybridity 
is not merely a matter of collaboration but of chimerical enmeshment. It creates a blind spot in thinking 
about security governance that excludes both thorough analysis of the salient political implications of 
hybridity and a debate about the prospects and dilemmas of reform these pose. To make this point, the 
section elaborates on the example of the lack of attention to the discourses commodifying security (public 
and private) resulting from the hybridization of the field. 
Today the language of the organization advocating a large role for private companies in peace 
operations may seem Orwellian to many. The association terms itself the International Peace Operations 
Association (www.ipoaonline.com) and refers to the private military/security industry as the “peace and 
stability industry”. However, it is not long since the entire framing of the discussion about security 
governance in terms of private military and security companies, private military and security services, and a 
global market for force would have seemed similarly odd and Orwellian to many. This shift is well captured 
by the title of one of the many edited books on the subject: from mercenaries to markets (Chesterman and 
Lehnardt, 2007). This slide in language is not merely nominal, indicating that we now have new ways of 
talking about security. It is a shift in how security is understood and judged. With the language of markets 
(rather than mercenaries) comes a range of positive connotations. The markets are dissociated from the 
longstanding norm against mercenaries (Percy, 2007) that is ritually invoked in critique (Scahill, 2007, War 
on Want, 2006). With the language of markets also comes a concentration on questions of efficiency rather 
than on questions of the politics in which the use of force (and hence efficient intervention) is but one option 
among many. The market language effectively de-politicizes security discussion and focuses attention on 
issues of efficiency.  
There is a tendency for “markets if, unchecked overstep their boundaries”; a tendency towards 
“market imperialism” (Radin, 1996: 47, Walzer, 1983: ?). The “discursive” harm done in the process 
involves defining subjects—in this case security—as commodities. This is straightforward when it comes to 
discussions about humans e.g. commodities: “...the harm [inflicted by commodification] is forthrightly 
discursive. Although our thought structure may tell us that the harm is much worse if a baby actually changes 
hands than if not. In this way of looking at matters we permit economists’ market rhetoric because its harm is 
different in magnitude from that of consummated sales, not because it is different in kind” (Radin, 1996: 
174). The logic is not fundamentally different in the security area. The market framing of security reframes 
security in as a non-political subject in a way that many find unacceptable but that appears rather less 
harmful because it is discursive in nature. 
This (contested) commodification of security is not something that can be attributed to the private, to 
the markets, to the companies in it, or to the IPOA alone. It is something that is actively produced, and all the 
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more effective for that reason, also within the public, the state institutions and state officials. It is a product 
of hybridity. The chimerical state is commodifying different areas of public life including security. It is 
bolstering the commodifying discourses spanning the public private divide. The consequence is a systematic 
bias in favor of commodification and against attempts to treat security as a political, a reshuffling power and 
reframing political subjects. One of the most potent effects of hybridity is that it blocks interrogations into 
this process not as a purely market driven one, but as one that is driven by a hybrid. It effectively distracts 
attention from the hybrid processes of commodification; from the significance of public state institutions 
deploying their “monopoly on symbolic violence” to vehicle understandings of security as commodified. The 
state and public institutions profoundly shape understandings. Hence when states sanction commodified 
understandings of security in doings, picturing/writing it is of great importance. A “hyperbolical suspicion” 
of the state is always warranted but also always exceedingly difficult (Bourdieu, 1994). Overlooking 
hybridity increases that difficulty further. It comes with a connotation of commercializing discourses as 
located only in the private. The private-public distinction resting on the general assumption that the public 
counters the private is extremely unhelpful in a context where a public-private hybrid chimera is fuelling the 
private. 
 De-facto excluding a key aspect of the commercialization of security governance from the 
analysis—its hybrid origins—makes it extremely difficult to discuss the regulatory issues and need for 
institutional innovation that arises directly from hybridity. As underlined above, the dominant assumption is 
that we just need more/better regulation along existing lines and/or a reestablishment of boundaries. But one 
of the fundamental issues of any regulation is the double bind weighing on regulators: regulation will 
inevitably act in ways that reinforce status quo, confirming and consolidating the markets and a commodified 
security understanding and make alternative views of security ever more dim and distant. Regulation may be 
warranted by the problems security/military markets raise, but they also render alternatives to the market 
moot. This double bind problematic underlies—and one might therefore have thought informed—most 
regulatory discussion. But this is far from true. The scarcity of attempts to grapple with this fundamental 
double bind is one of the most immediate consequences of allowing public-private divide—rather than 
hybridity—to frame thinking and discussion (Sapone, 1999 is an exception to the rule). The framing of the 
regulatory discussions seems to exclude the key concern.  
 In logical prolongation, the public private framing makes it difficult to even raise the question of 
what kind of institutional and regulatory innovation required to deal with a hybrid context. For example, 
thinking about how to avoid that security professionals redefine/reshape politics is relatively elaborate and 
there is are correspondingly elaborate institutional and sociological norms limiting the role of public security 
professionals working for a public state institution in shaping politics. There is little equivalent for private 
and/or hybrid security professionals working in hybrid/private contexts (Leander, 2007b). Yet, the challenge 
is a major one. Private/hybrid security professionals engage in politics by advertising their expertise, selling 
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their products, by lobbying, by providing expert consultancies and opinions to public policy-makers. They 
are reshaping the way states but also private and hybrid entities govern themselves. Yet we have little 
thinking about if and how this influence of security professionals on politics ought to be checked and if yes 
in by what means. Would it for example be warranted to set boundaries around “free entrepreneurship” by 
limiting/regulating free speech, advertising, brokerage, training etc. All these things are done for the public 
security professionals in relation to public policies. Raising the question if the hybridization of the profession 
requires innovation and institutional change to make the measures cover also the hybrid private professionals 
working for a hybrid/private organizations is important. The public private divide effectively distracts 
attention from the issue, by framing the discussion in public private terms. 
The public private divide effectively displaces critical attention from the attention on the hybrid chimera 
itself. It focuses it on improving the workings of private and public logics, on the importance of re-
establishing and reaffirming the separation of spheres. In the process it obscures the reshuffling of power 
relations taking place. More than this, it hampers regulatory critique. The double bind weighing on 
regulation in hybrid contexts is obscured as are the issues raised specifically by hybrid forms. 
 
4. Conclusion: The Power of the Public/Private 
The chimera of classical mythology is not only a hybrid creature. It is also an obscure, illusive one; a non-
being eluding investigation and capture. The monstrousness of the chimera stems from the combination of 
these two characteristics: the hybrid and the obscure. The argument in this paper is that an analogous 
argument can be made with regard to the contemporary chimerical state. It is not only a “public-private 
hybrid” and illusive creature that seems amazingly good at evading critical security. The paper has delved 
into the origin of this elusiveness, suggesting that to no small part it is to be found in the omni-present, 
inescapable public-private divide that haunts and structures discussions about the chimerical state (including 
in Hurt and Lipschutz’s lead paper for this meeting).  
The argument has concentrated on the role of public-private divide in obscuring chimerical power. 
The rationale for this focus is the classical insight that power is never as effective as when it is invisible. The 
paper therefore proceeded to trace three mechanisms by which the public-private divide worked to obscure 
power: its role in obscuring responsibility, institutional change and regulatory requirements. This argument is 
limited in scope or focus. It does not purport to be exhaustive e.g. by covering all processes by which hybrid 
state power becomes a chimera or even all processes by which the public-private divide contributes to 
making it so. It points to limited but significant processes in the area of hybrid security governance. 
 These processes are likely to remain significant and therefore merit attention for quite some time. 
They are in essence self-reinforcing: the framing of debate and discussion in terms of the public-private 
divide, the enactment of this divide in security practices and the ongoing instrumentalization of the divide for 
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various purposes and by all kinds of actors ensure its continued relevance. For example security 
professionals will continue to make the public-private divide key in their professional practices. Belonging to 
national armed forces/police, military hierarchies and grades, past service and career in the public continue to 
be absolutely essential for security professionals and something they instrumentalize also in their hybrid 
existence. Similarly, practices of institutional change and regulation will continue to be framed by this 
divide, to instrumentalize it and (therefore) to reinforce it. However, that the divide is there and will remain 
makes it more—not less—urgent to turn attention to the hybrid it puts in the blind spot. 
 Problematizing the public-private is in no way impossible. The public-private divide is escapable. Not 
in the sense that its imprint on political imaginaries can be avoided9
  
 but in the sense that it is possible to 
critically assess what that divide does; its productive power. In the context of the chimerical state, looking at 
the role of the private-public divide in practices—doings, sayings, writings, picturing and discussions—is an 
inroad to capturing how it contributes to the constitution and strengthening of the chimera. More 
constructively, it is also a way of making its productive role visible and hence of opening avenues for 
reflexivity and debate. This may not render the chimera less hybrid but it may make it less obscure, less 
monstrous and hence more amenable to political control. 
                                                     
9 I continue to find Bauman’s (e.g. , 1988-9, , 1999) insistence of the difficulties tied to our limited political imagination 
extremely helpful.  
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